we applied generalized linear model regression to analyze the impact of added benefit on the difference between negotiated prices and the prices of comparators. Data were extracted from the Federal Joint Committee's appraisals and price databases. We specified added benefit in various ways. In all models, we controlled for additional criteria such as size of patient population, European price levels, and whether the comparators were generic. Results: Our regression results confirmed the descriptive results, with price premiums reflecting the extent of added benefit as appraised by the Federal Joint Committee. On the substance level, an added benefit was associated with an increase in price premium of 227.2% (P o 0.001) compared with no added benefit. Moreover, we saw increases in price premium of 377.5% (P o 0.001), 90.0% (P o 0.001), and 336.8% (P o 0.001) for added benefits that were "considerable," "minor," and "not quantifiable," respectively. Beneficial effects on mortality were associated with the greatest price premium (624.3%; P o 0.001), followed by such effects on morbidity (174.7%; P o 0.001) and adverse events (93.1%; P ¼ 0.019). Conclusions: Price premiums, or "value," are driven by health gain, the share of patients benefiting from a pharmaceutical, European price levels, and whether comparators are generic. No statement can be made, however, about the appropriateness of the level of price premiums.
Introduction
Health systems vary in structure and in the needs and preferences of their populations. As a consequence, the assessment of health technologies and related decisions on the pricing and reimbursement of pharmaceuticals differ across countries as well [1] [2] [3] .
Invariably, the concept of value plays an important role in health technology assessment. Yet looking at how different stakeholders define what attributes contribute to value [4] and how different countries have used the concept to help determine the prices of pharmaceuticals [5] [6] [7] reveals great heterogeneity. Paris and Belloni [6] even describe the application of value-based pricing (VBP) strategies as "more of an art than a science."
In Germany, a fourth-hurdle process, which leads to a change in launch prices after the pharmaceutical's first year on the market, was introduced in 2011 with the German Pharmaceutical Restructuring Act (AMNOG). With this legislation, the German government aimed to ensure that pharmaceutical prices would be economically efficient while not inhibiting innovation [8] .
The AMNOG process consists of two phases. First, new pharmaceuticals are assessed to determine whether they have an added therapeutic benefit over the current standard of care, defined as "appropriate comparative therapy" by the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA). (For the sake of simplicity, we use the term "comparator" in this article.) To do so, an initial advisory assessment is made by the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care, followed by a final appraisal of the G-BA. Second, pharmaceutical prices are negotiated between manufacturers and the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds (GKV-SV). If the negotiations fail, prices are set by an arbitration board [9] . By law, substances that do not have an added benefit over their comparator should not lead to annual treatment costs that are higher than those of the comparator. For substances with an added benefit, however, the annual treatment costs may exceed those of the comparator by a premium that is in line with the extent and certainty of the added benefit specified in the appraisal of the G-BA.
Although the determinants of coverage decision making have been studied well for countries that use formal economic evaluations (e.g., United Kingdom and Australia) [1, [10] [11] [12] , the determinants of decision making and pricing in two-stage administered systems [13] , such as Germany, have not. Neither the determinants of decision making in Germany, which have been studied only descriptively [14, 15] , nor the determinants of price negotiations' outcomes [16] [17] [18] have been analyzed conclusively.
In the present study, we analyzed whether price premiums negotiated in the second phase of the AMNOG process do indeed reflect 1) the G-BA's previous appraisals on the pharmaceuticals' added benefit; 2) the criteria, which are set out in a framework agreement between manufacturers and the GKV-SV [19] , such as the size of the patient population; and 3) further aspects, such as the manufacturers' experience in negotiating prices. Furthermore, we explored the magnitude of the price premiums granted for different extents of added benefit.
Methods

Study Setting
We included data on all pharmaceuticals that had completed the second phase of the AMNOG process between January 1, 2011, and June 30, 2016. In cases in which the price of a pharmaceutical had been renegotiated (e.g., because of a re-assessment or an extension to a new indication), we included results from only the first negotiations to eliminate potential bias resulting from strategic behavior of manufacturers. We excluded assessments of so-called orphan drugs because these do not have to demonstrate an added benefit over a comparator and thus do not include data on comparator costs. We also excluded pharmaceuticals for which manufacturers had decided not to start or complete negotiations and had therefore opted out of the German market. Last, we excluded benefit assessments with comparators defined as "best supportive care" because the G-BA does not publish comparator costs in these cases.
We extracted data from publicly available G-BA appraisals as well as from the German price database Lauer-Taxe s and various international, publicly accessible price databases [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] .
Outcome Variable
We computed the relation between the annual treatment costs of a pharmaceutical and those of its comparator from the statutory health insurer's perspective (i.e., using pharmacy retail prices, including value-added tax minus manufacturer and pharmacy rebates as regulated by law):
Relation of costs ¼ Annual treatment costs of pharmaceutical Annual treatment costs of comparator Â 100
If the pharmaceutical and its comparator have equivalent costs, the relation amounts to 100%. The relation of costs can be transformed into a proportional price premium by subtracting 100 for descriptive analysis or by calculating marginal effects when used in regression models.
To calculate the annual treatment costs of a pharmaceutical, we used the expected treatment duration and dosage given in G-BA's appraisals in combination with postnegotiation prices from the German price database Lauer-Taxe. We also extracted annual treatment costs for the comparators directly from G-BA's appraisals. When applicable, we additionally extracted costs for concomitant medication and for procedures associated with the use of the pharmaceutical or its comparator from G-BA's appraisals.
Treatment costs were collected at a patient subgroup level. In cases in which several interchangeable comparators were eligible for the same patient subgroup, we calculated an average of their costs. When the comparator varied between patient subgroups, the population-weighted mean was calculated to determine a pharmaceutical's comparator's cost. We obtained patient population sizes from G-BA's appraisals.
Variable of Interest
When determining the level of a pharmaceutical's added benefit for each patient subgroup, the G-BA considers the following end points: mortality, morbidity, adverse events, and quality of life. We therefore specified the G-BA's appraisal of a pharmaceutical's added benefit in our six regression models in the following ways.
In model A.1 we considered whether an added benefit ("not quantifiable," "minor," "considerable," or "major") had been assigned for at least one patient subgroup or not ("less benefit" or "no added benefit"). In cases in which no added benefit has been assigned, the annual treatment costs of the new substance should not exceed those of its comparator. In model A.2 we took into account differences in added benefit across patient subgroups, specifying the share of the patient population that had been appraised as experiencing an added benefit.
For models B.1 and B.2 we differentiated between "no added benefit" and the four categories of added benefit. We distinguished between the greatest extent of added benefit that had been assigned at the substance level (model B.1) and the particular shares of the patient population that had been assigned a major, considerable, minor, or not quantifiable added benefit (model B.2).
Models C.1 and C.2 reflect whether the G-BA decided that the pharmaceutical showed beneficial effects in particular end point categories (mortality, morbidity, adverse events, and quality of life) (model C.1) as well as the corresponding shares of the patient population (model C.2).
Control Variables
The selection of control variables is based 1) on the framework agreement [19] between manufacturers and the German statutory health insurance and 2) on previous literature on coverage decision making [1] . First, we included the total number of patients eligible for a new pharmaceutical as specified in its marketing authorization [11, 19, 32, 33] . This was obtained from G-BA's documentation. Second, as required in the framework agreement, the annual treatment costs of so-called comparable medication are to be taken into account [19] . According to the framework agreement, a comparable medication is authorized within the same medical indication as the new pharmaceutical and its usage is appropriate according to international standards of evidence-based medicine. Yet, it is unequal to the G-BAdefined "comparator" (standard of care). Because no information on the comparable medication used is disclosed after price negotiations are completed, we used an approximation by specifying a binary variable that captures whether a comparable medication is available at the fourth level of the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Classification System. In addition, the comparable medication had to be 1) listed in the German LauerTaxe price database at the time of completed price negotiation and 2) authorized for the same medical indication as the new pharmaceutical [19] . The presence of alternative treatments or the "innovativeness" of a new pharmaceutical has also been used as a control variable in the literature [10] [11] [12] [33] [34] [35] .
Last, price negotiations must take account of the new pharmaceutical's actual sales prices in other European countries [19] . We therefore attempted to extract the pharmaceutical's exfactory prices for 14 European countries from publicly available European databases, and were able to do so for the Czech Republic [21] and France [22] . Because ex-factory prices were not always available, we surveyed the pharmaceutical's price to pharmacy for Ireland [23] and Sweden [24] , and the pharmacy retail prices for Belgium [25] , Denmark [26] , Finland [27] , Italy [28] , the Netherlands [29] , Portugal [30] , and Slovakia [31] . To calculate the ex-factory prices, we used average wholesaler and pharmacy margins estimated by Kanavos et al. [36] . The framework
agreement specifies that price data from Austria, Spain, and the United Kingdom should also be taken into account in negotiations, but these were not publicly available. Contrary to the framework agreement, we did not include price data from Greece because the GKV-SV and manufacturers have agreed to temporarily exclude Greece from the European price basket [9] . We calculated an average ex-factory price per defined daily dose for each substance per country and weighted prices across countries according to purchasing power parities and population sizes from the Eurostat database [37] to obtain a substance's European price level.
In addition, we controlled for whether a pharmaceutical's comparator or all substances constituting a comparator were solely generic, because the price level of generics is substantially lower than that of substances under patent protection [38] . Also, because negotiation performance can be improved by experience [39] , we included the number of price negotiations a manufacturer had previously undertaken with the GKV-SV. Furthermore, we included indication fixed effects, distinguishing between oncological, infectious, and all other diseases [32, 33, 35, [40] [41] [42] (Table: "Overview of variables used within the analysis").
Statistical Analysis
After analyzing price premiums descriptively, we estimated six regression models. The dependent variable (i.e., the relation between a pharmaceutical's costs and those of its comparator) appeared to be gamma-distributed (many values at or close to 0), which we confirmed by applying the Modified Park Test [43] . Therefore, we could not use a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. To avoid retransformation problems we preferred a generalized linear model (GLM) over a log OLS model [43] . Applying the Pregibon Goodness of Link Test [44] we confirmed the usage of a log-link. Thus, we used a GLM with a log-link function to analyze the impact of added benefit on price premiums. To allow for meaningful interpretation, we calculated marginal effects for each variable, with all other variables set to their means.
We conducted several sensitivity analyses. First, because single observations may have a large impact on results based on such a small sample, we excluded substances with a Cook's D greater than the conventional cutoff point of 4/n [45] . Second, we controlled for whether pharmaceuticals had been assessed during the first 7 months after the AMNOG legislation came into effect. During this transitional period, manufacturers were advised on the completeness of their dossiers by the G-BA and, if required, were granted an additional 3 months to complete them [46] . Third, we included a variable that controlled for whether the final price had been set by the arbitration board. Last, instead of using average comparator costs when several interchangeable comparators were eligible for the same patient subgroup, we reran our models using the least and the most costly comparators.
All analyses were conducted using SAS version 9.4 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC).
Results
Between January 1, 2011, and June 30, 2016, 148 pharmaceuticals completed the second phase of the AMNOG process. Of the appraisals related to these, 26 involved orphan drugs, 28 were renegotiations, 13 had comparators defined as "best supportive care," and 20 involved manufacturers that had opted out of the German market, making it impossible to collect data on prices. Our final sample therefore contained 61 appraisals eligible for analysis (Fig. 1) .
Of the 61 pharmaceuticals covered in these appraisals, 31 (50.8%) had not been assigned an added benefit by the G-BA, 16 (26.2%) had been appraised as having a considerable added benefit, 12 (19.7%) as having a minor added benefit, and 2 (3.3%) as having an added benefit that was not quantifiable ( Table 1) . The 61 appraisals included in our study sample covered 153 patient subgroups. The comparator consisted of only one substance in 17 subgroups, of multiple substances in each of 29 subgroups, of a choice of substances or substance combinations in each of 103 subgroups, and of a nonmedicinal treatment in each of 4 subgroups.
Results of the Descriptive Analysis
For pharmaceuticals with no added benefit (N ¼ 31), the average price premium over the annual treatment cost of comparators was 9.1% (median 0%). For pharmaceuticals with an added benefit (N ¼ 30), however, this amounted to 286.4% (median 110.1%). Taking the extent of added benefit into account, price premiums were the highest for pharmaceuticals with a considerable added benefit (N ¼ 16) (arithmetic mean 444.7%; median 151.2%), followed by those for pharmaceuticals whose added benefit was not quantifiable (N ¼ 2) (arithmetic mean 110.1%; median 110.1%) or minor (N ¼ 12) (arithmetic mean 104.8%; median 35.0%) (Fig. 2) .
Price premiums varied substantially across therapeutic areas (Table 2 ). For example, the average price premium for a considerable added benefit was 127.7% for pharmaceuticals used in infectious diseases (N ¼ 8) and 1900.3% for a pharmaceutical used in diseases of the eye (N ¼ 1).
Results of the Regression Analyses
In model A.1 an appraisal of added benefit was associated with an increase in price premium of 227.2% (P o 0.001) compared with no added benefit. Correspondingly, model A.2 showed that any 1% increase in the share of patient population experiencing an added benefit was associated with an increase of 2.4% (P o 0.001) in price premium.
Looking at price premiums according to the extent of added benefit, model B.1 showed an increase of 377.5% (P o 0.001) for pharmaceuticals with a considerable added benefit, of 90.0% (P o 0.001) for a minor added benefit, and of 336.8% (P o 0.001) for a not quantifiable added benefit compared with no added benefit. In model B.2, a 1% increase in the share of patient population experiencing an added benefit was associated with an increase in price premium of 3.8% (P o 0.001) for a considerable added benefit, 1.5% (P ¼ 0.012) for a not quantifiable added benefit, and 0.6% (P ¼ 0.07) for a minor added benefit.
Model C.1 showed that an appraisal indicating a beneficial effect on mortality was associated with an increase in price premium of 624.3% (P o 0.001) compared with an appraisal that did not acknowledge such an effect. An appraisal of a beneficial effect on morbidity or adverse events was also associated with an Fig. 1 -Selection of study sample.
increase in a pharmaceutical's price premium of 174.7% (P o 0.001) or 93.1% (P ¼ 0.019), respectively. An appraisal of a beneficial effect on quality of life, however, was associated with a decrease in price premium of 118.7% (P ¼ 0.007). In model C.2, a 1% increase in the share of patient population benefiting in the end point categories mortality, morbidity, and adverse events was associated with increases in price premium of 3.7% (P o 0.001), 1.9% (P o 0.001), and 0.8% (P ¼ 0.211), respectively. Again, a 1% increase in the share of patient population benefiting in the end point category quality of life was associated with a decrease in price premium of 2.6% (P ¼ 0.027).
Five of the six models (A. Table 3) .
Results of the Sensitivity Analyses
Removing all substances from the study sample with a Cook's D greater than the conventional cutoff point of 4/n resulted in a reduction in sample size from 61 to 57. Subsequent regression results revealed substantially smaller but still highly significant estimates for the variables that described added benefit.
The variable that indicated whether a pharmaceutical was assessed during the 7-month transitional period after the AMNOG legislation had come into effect was not significant throughout all models.
In four of the six models (A.2, B.1, B.2, and C.2), the inclusion of a variable that indicated whether a pharmaceutical's price had V A L U E I N H E A L T H 2 0 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 9 2 7 -9 3 5
been set by the arbitration board was associated with a significant increase in the price premium for pharmaceuticals compared with no arbitration. Effects ranged from 121.0% (P ¼ 0.015; model B.1) to 167.0% (P ¼ 0.007; model C.2). At the same time, there was no change in the significance of any other variable in any of the six models. To account for potential uncertainties when it comes to the price of the comparator, we reran our analyses using the least costly and the most costly comparator instead of the average comparator costs. Doing so did not change regression results in the six models, with one exception. When using the least costly comparator to calculate average comparator costs, the variable for the comparators being solely generic became nonsignificant in all models.
Discussion
In this study, we analyzed whether the price premiums negotiated for new pharmaceuticals in Germany between January 1, 2011, and June 30, 2016, reflect previous appraisals made by the G-BA about the pharmaceuticals' added benefit, as was intended by legislation. We also examined whether the premiums reflect further criteria agreed upon in the framework agreement between manufacturers and the GKV-SV. Furthermore, we have systematically reported in this article on the magnitude of price premiums granted for different dimensions of added benefit.
Our results suggest that the intentions of the AMNOG legislation are generally being met. For pharmaceuticals with no added benefit, the prices negotiated during our study period yielded annual treatment costs that were no higher than those of their comparator. At the same time, price premiums were negotiated for pharmaceuticals that had been appraised as having an added benefit. Contrary to what is stated within the framework agreement, the size of the eligible patient population did not have a significant effect on the magnitude of price premiums. This could be explained by the assumption that substances eligible for large patient populations (e.g., diabetes) are being assigned no added benefit more frequently. Descriptive analyses indeed showed a greater average population for substances without an added benefit (926,315; median 95,000) than for substances with an added benefit (363,751; median 46,000). Nevertheless, conducting regression analysis for the subgroup of beneficial substances only did not show significant effects for the size of patient population. This, however, might also be the result of small sample size. The share of patients benefiting from a pharmaceutical, however, was valued in negotiations, as the results of our models A.2, B.2, and C.2 suggest.
Two of our models (C.1 and C.2) indicate that a pharmaceutical's effects on mortality were valued the highest, followed by its impact on morbidity and adverse events. Unexpectedly, the effects of a pharmaceutical on a patient's quality of life appeared to play a contradictory role. It should be noted, however, that only 4 of the 61 pharmaceuticals in our sample had been appraised as having a beneficial effect on quality of life. In all four cases, beneficial effects were seen not only for quality of life but also for other categories, which might suggest that beneficial effects in several end point categories are not valued additively. Also, the negative impact we observed on the price premium could merely be the result of small sample size.
Effects resulting from changes in the European price level were rather small but significant throughout all models. Thus, in accordance with the observations of Paris and Belloni [6] for member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, international price referencing also plays a (minor) role in the pricing of new pharmaceuticals in Germany. One could argue that the European price level is considered only after an added benefit has been assigned, as is stipulated by law. Nevertheless, when we used this as an interaction effect, our analyses suggested that the impact of the European price level on price premiums does not apply to substances with added benefit only (P ¼ 0.227). The estimates associated with a solely generic comparator were positive and significantly different from 0 throughout all models. The pharmaceutical industry has frequently argued that generic prices are inappropriate anchors when negotiating prices for pharmaceuticals with patent protection, because generic prices do not include costs for research and development or marketing [47] . Our results indicate that this objection may be taken into account during negotiations. Whether this price premium is large enough to address the industry's concern is another matter.
Last, because orphan drugs are assigned an added benefit per se by law, we might conclude that the rarity of an indication is also valued within the pricing of pharmaceuticals in Germany, even though we could not analyze the value of this directly.
Our results are contradictory to what Schwarz and Freiberg [16] , Radic et al. [17] , and Theidel and von der Schulenburg [18] found in their studies on the connection between added benefit and negotiated prices. From a methodological perspective, however, all three studies are not comparable with ours. Schwarz and Freiberg [16] as well as Theidel and von der Schulenburg [18] used the difference between initial launch prices and negotiated prices as dependent variable, which is, thus, influenced by a manufacturer's pricing strategy. Furthermore, the specification of independent variables in their OLS differs from our specification in the GLM. This is also true for the analyses of Radic et al. [17] who, in addition, looked at pharmaceuticals that were appraised an added benefit only [16] [17] [18] .
Overall, our results are comparable with those of Antoñanzas et al. [4] and Paris and Belloni [6] in their analyses of how different countries refer to value in the context of pharmaceutical pricing. Compared with UK's understanding of VBP, however, the AMNOG process, including the second stage of price negotiations, is not nearly as elaborate (yet). Claxton et al. [48, 49] look at VBP through the lens of current productivity levels in the National Health Service (NHS). According to their definition, a value-based price should ensure that the health gain associated with the use of a new technology is at least as great as the health expected to be forgone because of the new technology's additional costs. They posit that this should be assessed using empirically determined cost-effectiveness thresholds that reflect current NHS productivity levels in different therapeutic areas [48, 49] . Sussex et al. [50] regard the essence of VBP as being to ensure "that the maximum price the NHS will pay for a medicine is set where the incremental value of using it relative to the comparator treatment (…) just balances the incremental costs." As components of value they explicitly include criteria that go beyond a pharmaceutical-associated health gain, such as social value judgments used by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence in current health technology assessment or criteria grounded in bioethical arguments. Nevertheless, determining which criteria to consider; how to measure, value, and aggregate these; and how ultimately to link these to a maximum price are not only methodologically challenging but also depend on a range of normative value judgments [50, 51] .
Unlike the United Kingdom, Germany does not explicitly define a limited health care budget. There is therefore no need to identify and measure health forgone. Instead, new pharmaceuticals directly replace the current standard of care (i.e., the comparators defined by the G-BA). Intuitively, if additional money is not paid in cases in which there is no additional benefit, productivity levels will stay constant. At the same time, paying additional money for additional benefit is plausible. In the German setting, however, no statements can be made about the extent to which negotiated price premiums change current productivity levels. Indeed, considering that neither productivity levels nor incremental benefits are measured as part of the assessment methodology in Germany, and given the confidential nature and lack of transparency in price negotiations within the German system, no statements can be made about the appropriateness of price premiums. This confirms what Gerber et al. [7] pointed out shortly after AMNOG's introduction in 2011. The introduction of health economic evaluation could not only be of help to enable the assessment of the appropriateness of price premiums, but could also increase the transparency of the process [52] . Until now, pharmaceutical pricing in Germany can be considered only to be "value-based" in the very broadest sense -namely, that the negotiated price premiums reflect the extent of added benefit as appraised by the G-BA.
Study Limitations
Our study has several important limitations. First, although we included information from every negotiation currently available, our sample size was small, potentially rendering influential independent variables nonsignificant and restricting the number of variables we could add to the model. Our descriptive and regression results must therefore be interpreted with caution.
Second, although our sensitivity analyses suggest that our results are quite stable for the variables of interest, outliers can have an impact in such a small sample. This can be seen in the sensitivity analysis based on Cook's D, in which the four observations with the highest price premiums were excluded and, consequently, effect sizes changed considerably.
Third, when collecting our data, we depended on information that was publicly available. We could neither observe nor account for things "between the lines" or compromises made in real-life negotiations. For example, there may have been compromises between manufacturers and GKV-SV concerning the interpretation of comparators, especially in cases in which the comparators consist of combinations and/or multiple alternatives. Here, it is conceivable that recent data on physician prescribing patterns could be introduced into the negotiations, revealing that the use of one comparator alternative is much more common than that of another. Similarly, it is plausible that negotiations may make use of more recent data on disease prevalence, leading to changes in the size of patient groups thought to benefit from a pharmaceutical. Although this would create only minor distortions in our calculations, it could explain why the mean price premium for no added benefit in our descriptive analysis was 9.1% (median 0%) although it should be 0% by law.
Conclusions
When it comes to the pricing of pharmaceuticals in the context of AMNOG, our results suggest that the intent of the legislation is generally being met. When there is no evidence of an added benefit, the negotiated prices yield annual treatment costs that are no higher than those for the comparators. At the same time, higher price premiums are generally negotiated for more beneficial pharmaceuticals. The price premiums themselves appear to be driven by health gain, the share of patients benefiting from a pharmaceutical, and the rarity of diseases. Furthermore, the generic status of comparators and European price levels do play a role in pricing.
Nevertheless, this all being said, we are unable to make any statements about the appropriateness of the level of price premiums. Although in practice policy decides on "appropriate" price premiums, this rather is (or should be) the answer to normative questions related to a population's preferences and its associated willingness to pay [53, 54] . Questions like this will most likely be addressed to some extent through frameworks for VBP such as those currently being discussed in the United Kingdom [49, 50] . Pricing within the scope of AMNOG may therefore be considered only to be value-based in the very broadest sense, namely, in that negotiated price premiums reflect the extent of added benefit as appraised by the G-BA. Nevertheless, compared with the concept and operationalization of VBP, the AMNOG process, including the second stage of price negotiations, is not nearly as elaborate (yet).
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